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THIRTY YEARS OF TERRITORIAL RESTRUCTURING 
IN GREECE (198I-2010) 
Vasilis Leontitsis* 
This article examines the decentralisation process that took place in Greece from 1981 
until 2010. Although Greece remains a highly centralised state, considerable decentralisa­
tion reforms were undertaken during this period. Those reforms affected all subnational 
levels of government. Nevertheless, despite the considerable changes, the fundamentals of 
the polity have remained relatively untouched. The paper examines the causal factors of 
decentralisation reforms throughout this period alongside the obstructing factors that re­
sisted them, thus contributing towards the relative inertia of the polity structures. The 
main argument put forward is that it was mainly domestic factors that shaped the decen­
tralisation process in the country. Party politics, the démocratisation discourse and, later on, 
managerial concerns influenced the reform process greatly. Additionally, structural charac-
teristics of the Greek socio-political system, such as veto points at the local and national 
levels, obtruded change, while the role of certain individual actors who acted as policy en-
trepreneurs and pushed the reforms up the political agenda should not be underestimated. 
Europeanisation and other international factors were of secondary importance in the 
whole process. Nevertheless, one should not overlook them altogether, since their inter-
relation with the aforementioned domestic factors produced considerable consequences. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Greek polity is one of the most centralised in Europe. Historical condi-
tions have contributed towards creating and sustaining a centralistic and 
rather anachronistic polity design. However, a number of decentralisation re-
forms have indeed taken place within the last thirty years. In that sense, it is 
imperative to assess the reforms that have occurred and their importance. 
Contrary to the Greek legal and political tradition, the wider English-
* Dr Vasilis Leontitsis is Politics Tutor at Sheffield International College. 
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speaking literature defines decentralisation as the overarching process of trans-
ferring powers to subnational authorities. Hence, it refers to the "process of 
state reform composed by a set of public policies that transfer responsibilities, 
resources, or authority from higher to lower levels of government in the con-
text of a specific type of "state".1 Decentralisation, thus, is the transfer of po-
litical, administrative and/or financial power from the centre to any sub-
national authority, whereas déconcentration is the transfer of administrative 
and/or fiscal (but not political) power only to those authorities that are directly 
accountable to the central state. Hence, déconcentration is just an aspect or a 
sub-category of decentralisation. This is how the two terms will be used here. 
The present article explores the territorial restructuring reforms that have 
taken place since 1981. The main argument put forward is that Greece has in-
deed managed to decentralise its polity within the period covered by this 
analysis. Regional authorities have been created and regional government elec-
tions have finally taken place; the municipalities have been strengthened and 
increased in size; and a more lasting subnational government design has been 
put in place. However, there are certain elements that have remained intact, 
and the polity at large remains centralistic. The European Union has not 
proven to be the most decisive factor in altering the system. Instead, it is do-
mestic factors that have been of the greatest importance for both inertia and 
change. However, the interplay between domestic and international factors 
has been responsible for some of the changes that have taken place, which is 
something that should not be overlooked. 
Before embarking on any analysis, the author would like to clarify that the 
aim of this article is not to separate clearly between the different factor, nor to 
expose any universal or widely applicable laws underpinning territorial re-
structuring. This is not possible in open systems, such as the ones we analyse 
in social sciences in general and in political science in particular, but only in 
closed systems.2 The latter allow for experimental activity that can potentially 
measure the exact effects of each factor by keeping other factors, constant, 
while the former do not. This is a principal position of critical realism, the 
ontological and epistemological position that underpins this research. 
Additionally, one needs to bear in mind that in our societies most phe-
1. T.G. Fallen, "A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Com-
parative Perspective", American Political Science Review, V. 99 (3), 2005, p. 328. 
2. For the concepts of open and closed systems, see R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of 
Science, Leeds Books Ltd., Leeds 1975. 
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nomena are multi-causal. Hence, events can only be seen as conjunctures, that 
is, as resulting from a number of factors.3 Multi-causality can potentially re­
veal another issue that might arise when one attempts to clearly separate be­
tween different factors. For such an act would leave out the combined effects 
causal factors have, which might prove to be crucial for the final outcome. 
To sum up, the aim of this piece is predominantly to identify the different 
factors and try to see how they interrelate to produce results. In a number of 
cases, effort will be made to determine whether some factors have been more 
pronounced than others in shaping an outcome, but one always needs to bear in 
mind that factors have worked together and never in complete isolation. In 
practice, clear and quantifiable separation is impossible and indeed even un­
necessary, since events manifest themselves as products of causal mechanisms, 
which comprise a number of causal factors and the way in which they inter­
relate. 
The subject of the political decentralisation in Greece has been dealt with 
before.4 Nevertheless, since the process is ongoing, research that has taken 
place in previous years has missed out on recent reforms. Another flaw in the 
existing literature, and the English-speaking literature in particular, literature is 
that it tends to be preoccupied a priori with the EU as the overarching factor 
of change. This way of dealing with the subject is methodologically flawed. 
Starting from the causes in order to examine the effect can lead us to attribute 
3. Ibid. 
4. Indicatively, see F. Papageorgiou - S. Verney, "Regional Planning and the Integrated 
Mediterranean Programmes in Greece", in R. Leonardi (ed.), The Regions and the European 
Community, Frank Cass, London 1993, pp. 139-161; K. Featherstone - G.N. Yannopoulos, 
"The European Community and Greece: Integration and the Challenge to Centralism", in M. 
Keating - B. Jones (eds.), The EU and the Regions, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995, pp. 249-
266; P.C. Ioakimidis, "EU Cohesion Policy in Greece: The Tension Between Bureaucratic 
Centralism and Regionalism", in L. Hooghe (ed.), Cohesion Policy and European Integration, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996, pp. 342-363; P C Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization 
of Greece: An Overall Assessment", in K. Featherstone - G. Kazamias (eds.), Europeanization 
and Southern Periphery, Frank Cass, London and Portland, Or. 2001, pp.73-94; N.K. Χλε-
πας, Η Τοπική Διοίκηση στην Ελλάδα: Ο διαλεκτικός ανταγωνισμός της αποκέντρωσης με 
την αυτοδιοίκηση, ibid.; P. Getimis - C.J. Paraskevopoulos, "Europeanization of Regional 
Policy and Institution-Building in Greece: A Neglected Aspect of Policy Evaluation?" Paper 
presented at the Regional Studies Association Conference on 'Evaluation and EU Regional 
Policy: New Questions and Challenges", Aix En Provence 31 May-1 June 2002; G. Andreou, 
"EU Cohesion Policy in Greece: Patterns of Governance and Europeanization", South Euro­
pean Society & Politics, Vol. 11 (2), 2006, pp. 241-259. 
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the effect solely to the cause(s) we have originally had in mind. In other words, 
problems of mono-causality may occur. Although the EU may be important, 
one should try to co-examine the possible influence of other factors, such as 
domestic ones. Europeanization and globalisation have been analysed exces-
sively during the last years. However, as Bukowski et al. have noted, there is a 
danger of over-relying on macrodeterminism from above.5 
This article follows the theoretical layout proposed in the introduction of 
this special issue. Hence, the theoretical foundations are based on historical 
institutionalism. The latter allows us to observe dynamic phenomena, while 
restoring the importance of historical conditions in defining current political 
arrangements. Historical institutionalism, as a structural theory, does not ac-
commodate well for the actions of certain actors in changing political systems.6 
However, certain actions taken by key actors have proven to change historical 
conditions and led to lasting change. Hence, the analysis to follow will keep 
an open eye regarding the actors' ability to bring about transformation. 
Finally, the article covers the period from 1981 until the latest local 
government reform; the so-called "Kallikratis" reform. The year 1981 has not 
been chosen randomly. 1981 is the year when the Greek Socialist Party 
(PASOK) gained power in Greece for the first time, promising the radical de-
centralisation of the polity. In the same year, Greece became officially a mem-
ber of the EEC. Thus, if one is to explore to what extent the EU has been a main 
factor towards reforming the system, 1981 is the logical year to start from. 
2. THEORY 
The introduction of this special issue has already discussed some of the major 
issues surrounding historical institutionalism. Hence, this section will only 
give a schematic account of this theoretical perspective, its main proposals 
and debates surrounding it. 
5. J. Bukowski et al., "Introduction", in J. Bukowski et al. (eds.), Between Europeanization 
and Local Societies: The Space of Territorial Governance, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Lanham, Md. and Oxford 2003, pp. 1-21. 
6. See the Introduction of this special issue; see also the interesting debate that took place 
between C. Hay - D. Wincott, "Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism", Political 
Studies, Vol. XLVI, 1998, pp. 951-957 and P.A. Hall - RC.R. Taylor, "The Potential of 
Historical Institutionalism: A Response to Hay and Wincott", Political Studies, Vol. XLVI, pp. 
958-962. 
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Historical institutionalism (HI) is one of the major strands of new institu-
tionalism, the others being rational choice, sociological institutionalism and 
discursive institutionalism 7 It puts emphasis on time, timing and tempo, and is 
well suited to analyse dynamic phenomena that span through long periods of 
time. As a theoretical perspective, HI can be used as an umbrella theory, incor-
porating elements from all other strands of new institutionalism.8 In that sense, 
it could explore not only material phenomena, but ideational ones as well, com-
bining the tangible explanations of rational choice with the more nuanced and 
abstract explanations of sociological and discursive institutionalisms. 
HI, like all strands of new institutionalism, is interested in institutions in 
the broader sense, since it is claimed that the socio-political world around us 
is kept together by these institutions. Hence, it is fundamental for HI to ex-
plore how they reproduce themselves and how they change. The themes of 
continuity and change are so important that they have become its critical 
point of focus. 
According to HI, continuity is achieved by what is called path dependence. 
Path dependence in simple terms means that, since an institution has been 
created and a path of action has been adopted, change is hard to occur. The 
more time has passed since the creation of the institution, the more difficult it 
is to change or abolish it. Institutions become "sticky" and institutional inertia 
is the outcome.9 
According to Pierson10 and Mahoney,11 institutional stickiness is the out-
come of self-reinforcing sequences that are connected to positive feedback. 
The longer an institution is around, the more desirable it is to retain it rather 
than start a new path. There are a number of arguments explaining why this is 
so. Institutional creation is a process that demands for a lot of human effort 
7. P.A. Hall - R.C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms", 
Political Studies, Vol. 44 (5), 1996, pp. 936-957; V.A. Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism: 
The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 11, 
2008, pp. 303-326. 
8. M.A. Pollack, "The New Institutionalisms and European Integration", in A. Wiener -
T. Diez (eds.), European Integration Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004, p. 139. 
9. P. Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics", American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 94 (2), 2000, pp. 251 -267. 
10. Ibid; P. Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, N.J. and Oxford 2004. 
l l . J . Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology", Theory and Society, Vol. 29, 
2000, pp.507-548. 
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and entails considerable material costs.12 Additionally, the fact that there is a 
certain way of doing things reduces uncertainty, whereas the creation of new 
institutional arrangements will demand for a period of learning; it might even 
reduce productivity. Another explanation is that an institutional setting re-
flects and also reinforces certain power arrangements.13 It is obvious that the 
actors who have been empowered by the functioning of a certain institution 
will try to perpetuate its existence. Veto points are created and changing the 
institutional design becomes a difficult and rather cumbersome process. 
Finally, when an institution has been present for a long period of time, its ex-
istence inevitably becomes naturalised.14 Actors sometimes find an institution 
so engrained to their own lives that in some cases they might even consider its 
abolishment unimaginable. 
Those are some reasons that explain why institutions do reproduce them-
selves and why inertia is so common. However, sometimes institutions do 
change, and the question is how. From time to time, conditions are ripe for a 
change of paths. This is when a critical juncture, or a window of opportunity, 
arises.15 When the window of opportunity is seized, a turning point is 
achieved. When it is not, the window of opportunity eventually closes and 
change does not occur. 
However, not all HI proponents adhere to this paradigm, which states that 
periods of continuity are followed by intervals of change; the so-called punc-
tuated equilibrium thesis. Change is not always something that happens fast 
and profoundly. On the contrary, in most cases, it comes about slowly. 
Hence, as this line of argument goes, it is naive to believe that we can separate 
between periods of changes and periods of stasis. Change happens constantly 
and in most cases incrementally. A number of scholars have tried to explore 
those processes of continuous, albeit incremental changes.16 Streeck and 
12. Ibid; P. Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis, op.ck. 
13. P. Pierson, "Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes", 
Studies in American Political Development, Vol. 14, 2000, p. 77; K. Thelen, "Timing and 
Tem porahty in the Analysis of Institutional Evolution and Change", Studies in Am encan Political 
Development, Vol. 14, 2000, p. 103. 
14. J. Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology", op.cit., p. 523. 
15. J.W Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed., HarperCollins, 
New York 1995. 
16. K. Thelen, "Timing and Temporality in the Analysis of Institutional Evolution and 
Change", op.cit.; K. Thelen, "How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical 
Analysis", in J. Mahoney - D. Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the 
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Thelen, in particular, have distinguished between a number of such processes; 
namely of displacement, layering, drift, conversion and exhaustion.17 Those 
different processes have something in common. They reveal instances when 
change is gradual, taking a long period of time to fully manifest itself. 
Sometimes change is so minute in a given period that it remains almost un­
detected, but in the long term it might have considerable repercussions. After 
discussing the relevant evidence in the following sections, I shall return to the 
theoretical issues at the end of this article. 
3. THE 1980s 
Greece is a very centralised state. A series of reforms throughout the 19th and 
early 20th century decisively empowered the central state at the expense of 
subnational government authorities.18 Hence, at the beginning of the 1980s 
the Greek territorial administrative structure consisted of only one level of lo­
cal self-government; the municipalities. They were small in terms of size and 
population, and their political weight was negligible. Regions did not exist. 
Instead, the only bodies of deconcentrated government were at the prefecture 
level. The prefect was appointed by the government and served for a set num­
ber of years. Subnational authorities were, above all, systematically starved of 
funding. Without the necessary funds, they could not even effectively exercise 
the little power they did possess. 
When PASOK came to power in 1981, it had already formulated a party 
platform strongly in favour of decentralisation. This was the first time in mod­
ern Greece that a political party adopted a language strongly supporting the 
territorial restructuring of the country. 
However, the radical decentralisation initially promised was not meant to 
Social Sciences, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, pp. 208-240; W. Streeck - K. 
Thelen, "Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies", in W. Streeck -
K. Thelen (eds.), Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Politica] Economies, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1-39. 
17. Ibid. 
18. For an excellent history of Greek subnational government, see Β. Ανδρονόπουλος - M. 
Μαθιουδάκης, Νεοελληνική Διοικητική Ιστορία, η.ρ., η.ρ. 1988; see also, Ν. Κ. Χλέπας, Η 
τοπική διοίκηση στην Ελλάδα: Ο διαλεκτικός ανταγωνισμός της αποκέντρωσης με την αυτο­
διοίκηση, op.cit.; V. Leontitsis, Decentralisation Reforms in Greece (1981-2008): Exploring 
Inertia and Change, Unpublished Phd Thesis, University of Sheffield, Sheffield 2009. 
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happen. Instead, a number of laws were initiated that only marginally changed 
the subnational government landscape. Hence, Law 1235/82 attempted to re­
vitalise prefectural councils, which, nevertheless, were not to be elected di­
rectly. Law 1270/82 provided for the establishment of neighbourhood coun­
cils and of the post of the deputy presidents (πάρεδροι) in small settlements 
belonging to bigger municipalities. Those new innovations were not accom­
panied by any decisive powers. Another law was passed in 1984 (Law 1416/ 
84), dealing with the promotion of municipal entrepreneurship and the cre­
ation of a legal framework for voluntary municipal mergers. Once again, its 
impact proved to be marginal. Only 31 voluntary mergers took place, despite 
the generous incentives offered, whereas municipalities hardly grasped the op­
portunity to develop entrepreneurial skills.19 
The most important innovation of the decade was the introduction of a 
regional level of government with Law 1622/86. The Greek territory was sub­
divided into 13 regions. Each one of them was presided by a secretary general 
(γενικός γραμματέας) and was given competences in the areas of regional de­
velopment and planning. The secretary general was directly appointed by the 
central government. There were also provisions in the law for the creation of 
elected prefectural councils (in reality, 75% of their members were to be di­
rectly elected), but the presidential decrees necessary for the activation of this 
part of the law were never issued. 
It is clear that the rhetoric adopted by PASOK was never matched in prac­
tice. The government introduced a number of innovations, in order to in­
crease citizens' participation in subnational government. Nevertheless, in­
creased participation did not necessarily mean a stronger voice for the people 
in regional and local affairs. Additionally, the new bodies that were created 
hardly enjoyed any serious competences and remained marginalised. 
There were many elements that contributed towards the relative inertia of 
the 1980s. A very important factor against the reforms was the central min­
istries' bureaucracies that dreaded the loss of power to the benefit of local po­
litical and administrative elites. When repeatedly asked to provide informa­
tion on which competences they could surrender to the prefectures, they 
either refused to give the relevant information or were in favour of surrender­
ing only the least important tasks.20 At the same time, many politicians at the 
19. Ibid, p. 89. 
20. P. Kaler-Christofilopoulou, Decentralisation in Post-Dictatorial Greece, Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, London 1989, pp. 301, 313. 
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central level fiercely opposed the creation of elected government at the pre­
fecture level, since they were afraid they would lose their own privileges and 
their clientelistic networks within the prefectures, which also served as con­
stituencies. Thus, both old-style politicians and central ministries' bureaucrats 
saw it as being in their interest to block the introduction of prefectural self-
government.21 
Even politicians at the local level tended to be against municipal mergers 
and the reorganisation of Greek local government. There were many heads of 
communes (πρόεδροι κοινοτήτων) that resisted discussions on municipal 
mergers, because they were afraid they would lose their own influence in local 
affairs. All in all, a number of factors pushed towards path dependence and 
the retention of the status quo. 
Those factors were to some extent counteracted by the influence of other 
forces pushing towards the territorial restructuring of the country. Contrary 
to what one might believe, the role of the European Union (then EEC/EC) in 
the 1980s was marginal. Of all reforms undertaken, only the creation of the 
regions was directly influenced by the EEC/EC. 
All existing literature on the subject agrees that the creation of the regions 
should be attributed mainly to the EU.22 One should bear in mind that the 
1986 law followed the implementation of the Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes (IMP). The country experienced considerable pressure in its ef­
fort to absorb the money, since its centralised regime and inefficient public 
sector did not allow for an efficient use of funds. This resulted in the need for 
the creation of regional authorities that would be able to manage future 
European funding.23 
Additionally, the country had to adapt to the newly established EC require­
ments that asked for the drafting and implementation of the programmes "at 
21. F. Papoudakis, The Impact of Structural Funds Regulations on Regional Policy Process 
in Greece, Unpublished PhD Thesis, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh 2001, p.94. 
22. F. Papageorgiou - S. Verney, "Regional Planning and the Integrated Mediterranean Pro­
grammes in Greece", op.cit.; S. Verney, "Central State-Local Government Relations", op.cit.; 
K. Featherstone - G.N. Yannopoulos, "The European Community and Greece: Integration 
and the Challenge to Centralism", op.cit.; P.C. Ioakimidis, "EU Cohesion Policy in Greece: 
The Tension Between Bureaucratic Centralism and Regionalism", op.cit.; Κ. Σπανού, Ελληνι­
κή διοίκηση και ευρωπαϊκή ολοκλήρωση, Παπαζήσης, Αθήνα 2001; G. Andreou, "EU Cohe­
sion Policy in Greece: Patterns of Governance and Europeanization", op.cit. 
23. P.C. Ioakimidis, "EU Cohesion Policy in Greece: The Tension Between Bureaucratic 
Centralism and Regionalism", op.cit. 
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the relevant geographical levels" and were asking for the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and partnership.24 This explains why the newly created 
regions had competences only in the area of regional development and plan-
ning. 
All other reforms of the decade should be attributed mainly to domestic 
factors. Of course, the reforms that were achieved reflected the governing 
party's ideology, while there was also pressure stemming from the PASOK 
manifestos and initial promises.25 At least during the first four years in office, 
PASOK s reforms were influenced by a strong démocratisation discourse and a 
perception that there should be more participation of citizens in local affairs. 
However, as the decade progressed, the initial revolutionary spirit of the 
Socialist government waned alongside its eagerness to reform. The realities of 
governing had moderated PASOK s enthusiasm towards a radical version of 
decentralisation. Instead, it became more pragmatic in the reforms it envis-
aged. Of course, decentralisation remained quite high on PASOK s agenda, 
but its new version of it never approached the original image pictured in the 
party manifestos of the 1970s. 
4. THE 1990's 
In the beginning of the 1990s, even the modest momentum that had been 
achieved in the 1980s was lost for a period of time. PASOK, which had, at 
least to some extent, endorsed decentralisation as a major political goal, was 
no longer in power from 1989. Nea Dimokratia, which was now in govern-
ment, was not particularly keen on decentralisation reforms, because of its 
own ideological reservations. At the same time, the deterioration of public fi-
nances and the radical political changes taking place in Europe were far more 
important issues to deal with. 
However, after PASOK took office again in 1993, the decentralisation 
process started afresh. It was then that the prefecture self-government was 
created. After decades of debating it, an elected second tier of local govern-
24. Council Regulation (EEC) 2088/1985; see also, S. Verney, "Central State-Local 
Government Relations", op.cit. 
25. P C Ioakimidis, "EU Cohesion Policy in Greece: The Tension Between Bureaucratic 
Centralism and Regionalism", op.cit.; Ν. Κ. Χλέπας, Η τοπική διοίκηση στην Ελλάδα: Ο δια­
λεκτικός ανταγωνισμός της αποκέντρωσης με την αυτοδιοίκηση, op.cit. 
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ment was to be implemented (Law 2218/94). The law was hastily drafted and 
it took a number of further, correcting and clarifying, laws before it was final­
ly put in place.26 
Most of the changes that did happen in the 1990s took place in the period 
between 1997 and 1999, after the so-called modernising faction within PASOK, 
also known as the Modernisers (Εκσυγχρονιστές), ascended to power. Under 
the leadership of the then Prime Minister Kostas Simitis and especially the 
Minister of the Interior, Alekos Papadopoulos, important legislation was initi­
ated. The role of the regions as a subnational level of deconcentrated govern­
ment was clarified and their administrative structure strengthened (Law 
2503/97). The acute issue of the extreme fragmentation of local government 
authorities was tackled with compulsory municipal mergers (Law 2539/97).27 
Hence, their numbers were decreased from just below 6,000 to 1,033 and 
their competences enhanced. However, the major urban centres of Athens 
and Thessaloniki were exempted from the reform, and although another piece 
of legislation was supposed to be initiated at a later date regarding the geogra­
phical areas of Attica and Thessaloniki, this never materialised. Additional 
competences were passed to regional, prefectural and municipal authorities 
(Law 2647/98), and the finances of the prefectural authorities were to some 
extent rationalised, more than four years after the introduction of the elected 
prefectural authorities. 
Hence, by the end of the 1990s the landscape of subnational government 
in Greece had changed significantly. There were now two levels of elected lo­
cal government (at the municipalities and the prefectures level), while the re­
gional authorities were moderately strengthened. Additionally, the number of 
local authorities was reduced radically and their competences increased. 
Nevertheless, there were many important issues that were not tackled, and 
the subnational architecture of the country remained incomplete. The role of 
the prefectures seemed to be rather ornamental in the inter-governmental re­
lations of the country, especially after the strengthening of both regions and 
municipalities.28 More importantly, the subnational government finances re­
mained in a dire state. As a matter of fact, the more competences were trans-
26. V. Leontitsis, Decentralisation Reforms in Greece (1981-2008): Exploring Inertia and 
Change, op. cit. 
27. The so-called "Kapodistrias" reform. 
28. Σ. Μπαμπάς, «Νομαρχιακή Αυτοδιοίκηση (αντί θεσμικής τομής ανάπηρο εγχείρημα)», 
Τοπική Αυτοδιοίκηση, Vol 1 (114), 1998, ρ. 16. 
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ferred without adequate funds to exercise them, the worse the subnational 
government finances became. 
The most important factors propelling the aforementioned reforms were, 
once again, mainly domestic in nature. During the 1990s, issues of démocra-
tisation seized to be as important as they were in the 1980s. The country had 
experienced stability and democracy for a good number of years, and thus the 
democratic craving of the 1970s and the early 1980s was to some extent satis-
fied. Progressively, it was managerial and efficiency concerns that started gain-
ing prominence. Elements of New Public Management (NPM) were progres-
sively incorporated into the Greek public administration, albeit with modest 
outcomes.29 Hence, a number of innovations, such as the strengthening of the 
regional authorities and the creation of a financial scheme for the prefectures, 
can be more clearly understood through the prism of the effort put into ratio-
nalising Greek public administration. 
The Modernisers' rise was the catalyst for the radical reforms of the second 
half of the 1990s. The logic behind the reforms they attempted was funda-
mentally based on a modernisation discourse. This discourse affirmed that for 
modernisation to be achieved Greek public administration in general and 
subnational government in particular had to function in better ways. The 
Modernisers stressed that the role of the central state should be steering and 
supervisory in nature, while subnational government should be able to exer-
cise most executive powers. 
Of course, beyond this rational perception of public administration there 
were plenty offerees opposing any change to the status quo, aiming at retain-
ing long-acquired benefits and powers. The prefectural self-government was 
brutally fought against by many MPs.30 Additionally, the municipal mergers 
were fought fiercely not only by local politicians, but also by local societies.31 
29. NPM is a term difficult to define. One could argue that it entails the introduction of 
private sector management techniques into the public sector. Increased attention is paid to effi-
ciency, productivity, target setting and revision, cost reduction, professionalisation, decentrali-
sation, privatisation and contracting out. 
30. Π. Χριοτοφιλοπούλου, "ΠΑΣΟΚ και Τοπική Αυτοδιοίκηση: οργανωτική δομή και πο­
λιτικές", in Μ. Σπουρδαλάκης (ed.), ΠΑΣΟΚ: Κόμμα-Κρότος-Κοινωνία, Παττάκης, Αθήνα 
1998, ρ. 207. 
31. For the protests that took place during that period, see Κ. Πετροπούλου (ed), «Κυνου­
ρία: Ο Ένας Δήμος Γέννησε... Τρεις», ΤΑ ΝΕΑ, September 18, 1997, ρ. 12. Also, see Γ. Γαρε-
δάκης - Π. Θεοδωρακόπουλος, «Αντιδράσεις σε Αχαΐα-Χανιά», ΤΑ ΝΕΑ, September 19, 1997, 
ρ. 9. 
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The man that proved to be a policy entrepreneur,32 initiating and support-
ing the radical reforms of 1996-1998, was the then Minister of the Interior, 
Alekos Papadopoulos. He pushed the reforms up the government agenda, de-
spite opposition. When there were many voices from within and outside his 
governing party calling for the withdrawal of the "Kapodistrias" law, he stood 
his ground and managed to achieve a favourable outcome. Alekos Papado-
poulos provided the necessary leadership. He insisted on change and was 
oblivious to the political costs which his decisions would inevitably bring 
about. 
The role of EU became more important during the 1990s. However, the 
extent of its importance has been fiercely debated. Ioakimidis, for example, 
has stated that most decentralisation reforms "were introduced as a response 
to the requirements of EU membership",33 refuting his earlier argument that 
"the impact of the EU on institutional arrangements has been rather margin-
al".34 Other scholars abide by the latter statement.35 
As a matter of fact, the role of the EU remained indirect, which is why it is 
so difficult to acquire a sense of its relative importance. Although there were 
no direct pressures regarding the institutional structure of the country, the ne-
cessities deriving from the EU regional policy and the incoming Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) had both positive and negative effects on the rel-
ative position of subnational authorities. 
For example, because of the poor performance of Greece during the first 
programming period, and after pressure from the Commission, an array of 
agencies and semi-public bodies were established to assist in the handling of 
regional funds.36 In the early 1990s external project management advisors 
were hired from the private sector, whereas during the 2nd Community 
32. According to Kingdon, policy entrepreneurs are individuals that are willing "to invest 
their resources -time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money- in the hope of future re-
turn". See J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, op.cit., p. 122. 
33. P.C. Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment", op.cit., pp. 
85-86. 
34. P.C. Ioakimidis, "EU Cohesion Policy in Greece: The Tension Between Bureaucratic 
Centralism and Regionalism", op.cit., p. 358. 
35. G. Andreou, "EU Cohesion Policy in Greece: Patterns of Governance and Europeaniza-
tion", op.cit., p. 253. 
36. F. Papoudakis, The Impact of Structural Funds Regulations on Regional Policy Process 
in Greece, op.cit.; G. Andreou, "EU Cohesion Policy in Greece: Patterns of Governance and 
Europeanization", op.cit., p. 250. 
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Support Framework, the Management Organisation Unit (MOU) was set up. 
The role of the Commission, and the Regional Policy DG in particular, was 
fundamental in influencing the establishment of those auxiliary institutions. 
The weak administrative capacity of the regions had compromised their abili-
ty to handle EU regional policy funds successfully and, since both the Greek 
government and the Commission became increasingly more preoccupied 
with issues of efficiency and fund absorption, the regions were soon partly 
supplanted in the regional policy process by those new institutions. 
The pressure to create the necessary structures to absorb the EU money had 
led to the establishment of the regions in the late 1980s and thus worked in 
favour of the regional tier of government. Paradoxically, the same forces, in 
the 1990s, threatened to reduce the influence of the regional and other subna-
tional authorities in regional policy. Hence, although the regions were strength-
ened administratively in absolute terms, their role was weakened vis-à-vis the 
central government and other newly institutionalised bodies dealing with re-
gional policy (see above). 
EU influence on the finances of subnational government was far greater 
than any institutional effects. EU funds provided the Greek subnational au-
thorities with a considerable amount of money, which they were in real need 
for. The municipalities in particular were able to put forward a number of 
projects that were financially supported by the EU funds. However, the in-
creased flow of funds from the EU did not signify increase subnational gov-
ernment influence in shaping regional policy. Instead, they remained second-
ary players that just made use of funds available to them.37 
At the same time, the Greek central government continued depriving sub-
national authorities of funds they needed urgently. The situation became con-
siderably worse by the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, since 
competences were transferred away from the central government, but funding 
of subnational authorities did not increase at the same pace.38 Part of the re-
luctance shown by the central government to fund subnational authorities was 
due to its efforts to reduce the country's deficit and fulfill the Maastricht eco-
nomic criteria to participate in the EMU. Hence, Europeanization proved to 
be a complicated factor. Aspects of it strengthened subnational authorities, 
while others weakened them. 
37.1 am indebted to George Andreou for this point. 
38. See ΚΕΔΚΕ-ΙΤΑ, Ol OTA σε αριθμούς, ΚΕΔΚΕ, Αθήνα 2006. 
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The way domestic and international factors have combined at times can be 
clearly seen when explaining the timing of the major reforms of the 1990s. 
Fear that Greece could be left out of the EMU was a powerful weapon in the 
hands of the modernising forces within the country in general and within 
PASOK in particular. When the modernising faction of PASOK came to power, 
it had a clear plan to advance a wider reformist agenda by tying it to the prospect 
of Greece's inclusion in the EMU. One of their goals was to reform subnational 
authorities, transferring competences to them and rationalizing their func-
tions. Thus, innovations at the EU level and the prospect of further integra-
tion empowered certain political actors within the country and indirectly in-
fluenced decentralisation reforms. 
5. THE 2000's 
After the radical reforms of the years 1996-1998, the pace of territorial re-
structuring subsided. The most important innovation at the beginning of the 
2000s was the constitutional amendment of 2001. The Constitution of 1975 
was not really progressive in terms of the structure and the competences of 
subnational authorities in Greece, while it also left many issues unresolved.39 
In particular, it devoted only two articles to subnational authorities. Article 
101 dealt with issues related to the deconcentrated authorities, while Article 
102 dealt with local self-government. 
The 2001 constitutional amendment altered both articles 101 and 102, 
and this amendment is still valid today. Among other things, control over 
subnational authorities is now confined to legality issues. The central govern-
ment cannot question the scope of subnational authorities' decisions. The 
number of elected subnational authorities is for the first time officially state, 
since there are provisions for two levels of elected subnational government. 
Finally, it is explicitly stated that the central State cannot transfer competences 
to subnational authorities without transferring the necessary funds for their 
exercise. 
It is true that the constitutional amendment did not alter much in practice, 
since it mostly adopted elements that had already been in place. Nevertheless, 
it was of particular significance, because it crystallised the changes that had 
39. V. Leontitsis, Decentralisation Reforms in Greece (1981-2008): Exploring Inertia and 
Change, op.cit. 
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taken place in Greece since the beginning of the 1980s. More importantly, 
there was broad consensus among the main political parties regarding the 
amended constitutional provisions and the whole process was described as a 
"consolidation of past reforms by consensus".40 
The next few years marked a period of relative stability for subnational au­
thorities. However, below the relatively stable surface, tensions continued and 
discussions were held about the future of subnational government in the 
country. Municipal and prefectural conferences were held agreeing that fur­
ther mergers had to be implemented, in a so-called "Kapodistrias II" reform. 
A window of opportunity opened, but the anticipated reforms did not mate­
rialise, mainly due to a lack of political entrepreneurship (see below). 
Although the territorial design of subnational government in Greece 
seemed to have achieved an unstable equilibrium, it changed once again radi­
cally in 2010, with the most far-reaching subnational government reform to 
date. Law 3852/2010, or the "Kallikratis" reform as it is popularly known, re­
duced the number of municipalities further from 1,033 to 325, abolished 
prefectures altogether, transformed the regions into the second level of subna­
tional self-government and created seven decentralised administrations (απο­
κεντρωμένες διοικήσεις); a new deconcentrated level of subnational govern­
ment. A number of new competences were given to the municipalities, such 
as in social policy, agriculture and planning. Even more competences were re­
served for the island municipalities. The latter, with the exception of the really 
small islands or the really big islands of Crete and Euboea, were to form one 
municipality each following the so-called one island - one municipality prin­
ciple. 
But what was behind the changes of the 2000s? And why was there relative 
stability followed by the radical changes of the "Kallikratis" reform? The per­
ceptions of the two major parties, Nea Dimokratia and PASOK, toward sub-
national government had progressively converged. The former was no longer 
against decentralising the polity anymore and its positions had become more 
or less identical to those of PASOK. Of course, there were voices in both par­
ties against giving away too much power, but at least in terms of polity design 
40. Ν. Κ. Χλέπας, «Αποκέντρωση και αυτοδιοίκηση στο νέο Σύνταγμα: Η αναθεώρηση των 
συνταγματικών ρυθμίσεων για την αποκέντρωση και την Τοπική Αυτοδιοίκηση. Συναινετική 
κατοχύρωση του "μεταρρυθμιστικού κεκτημένου";» in Α. Μακρυδημήτρης - Ο. Ζυγούρα 
(eck), Η διοίκηση και το Σύνταγμα, Αντ. Ν. Σάκκουλας, Αθήνα και Κομοτηνή 2002, pp. 41-
89. 
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their views converged. Hence, it should not come as a surprise that there was 
a high degree of agreement in the constitutional amendment, which was a 
rare example of consensual politics in a country where confrontational politics 
constitutes the norm. 
Years of operating within the broader European framework and the influ-
ence of a global neo-liberal ideology had played their own part in achieving 
and maintaining a minimum consensus between the major stakeholders. New 
Public Management (NPM) had gradually become the overarching discourse 
underpinning the territorial restructuring discussions. Its most important in-
fluence had to do with the nature of the reforms. Most changes were now re-
lated to managerial or financial concerns. It is interesting to observe how the 
system moved towards reforms that targeted the creation of more productive 
and functional subnational authorities. Most efforts pointed toward improv-
ing the role of subnational government as a provider of public goods. 
However, one should not overestimate the ability of NPM to change radi-
cally Greek public administration. NPM became the overarching principle 
that the proponents of reforms tended to invoke, but it failed to penetrate 
deep into Greek public administration. Hence, a major paradox occurred. 
NPM dictated most of the attempted reforms of the decade, but its failure to 
be widely defused and accepted within Greek public administration chal-
lenged the success of these reforms in practice. 
A major internal obstacle to reforms remained the negative stance of a 
great portion of the central political and bureaucratic elites. Modernisers from 
all segments of society were often the ones supporting the decentralisation of 
the polity, whereas more traditional forces wanted to preserve the centralised 
status quo, thus opposing NPM. Yet, ideology alone cannot explain the resist-
ance posed by the system. A lot of central ministry officials and politicians op-
posed decentralisation because they were eager to sustain the power they had 
accumulated. They tried to obstruct any transfer of power away from them, 
and even when favourable conditions for decentralisation reforms made it 
impossible to resist, they attempted to retain control over financial resources; 
an important source of power. 
However, the most important factor against exploiting the window of op-
portunity that had opened was the lack of a policy entrepreneur that would 
exploit the relative convergence in the views of the principal actors, in order 
to initiate radical reforms. Three successive Ministers of the Interior (Vasso 
Papandreou (1999-2001) and Kostas Skandalidis (2001-2004) for PASOK, as 
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well as Prokopis Pavlopoulos (2004-2009) for Nea Dimokratia) agreed that 
far-reaching reforms had to be instigated, but failed to promote them, pos-
sibly fearing the accompanying political cost. 
Domestic factors, both positive and negative, remained crucial. However, 
international factors, such as Europeanization, globalisation and policy trans-
fer continued growing in importance. During this period, Greece became in-
creasingly exposed to globalisation. Changes in transportation and technology 
meant that distances were shortened and the meaning of 'local' was re-
assessed. The economic and social transformations that were taking place ar-
guably required bigger and more efficient subnational units that would be able 
to compete in the global environment. 
Experience with the EU had shown that bigger subnational units were 
needed to handle the EU funds more efficiently. Moreover, years of associa-
tion with the EU institutions had distilled a certain amount of sympathy among 
reformists towards the creation of a stronger regional tier of government. The 
EU policies privileged fewer and stronger subnational authorities. This could 
be achieved with a second round of municipal mergers and a reduction in the 
number of regions. In such an institutional landscape there was no place for 
the prefectures. 
As the country increasingly engaged with its global and European surround-
ings, communication with the bureaucracies of other countries also intensi-
fied. Increasing socialisation forced Greece to look at the way other countries 
administered their own territories. In many cases, this remained a secondary 
factor that could indeed influence reforms, albeit in an indirect and thus less 
visible way. It is interesting to notice, for example, that the two waves of com-
pulsory municipal mergers in Greece followed, with some delay, similar re-
form efforts that had taken place in other European countries in the past. 
Reforms in other countries could set examples for domestic innovations. 
The convergence in the beliefs of a number of actors opened a window of 
opportunity since the early 2000s, but without a policy entrepreneur to cham-
pion the idea of reforms it failed to deliver any concrete outcomes. It was only 
when the Minister of the Interior for the newly elected PASOK government, 
Giannis Ragoussis, attempted to promote substantial changes in 2009-2010, 
that the country's subnational architecture was finally redrawn. 
The fact that Ragoussis had been a mayor of Paros before, which is a small 
Greek island, influenced some of the policy decisions in the "Kallikratis" law, 
such as the extended provisions related to island municipalities. "Kallikratis" 
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also reflected the need for larger subnational authorities, as discussed above. 
The law was met with hostility by local communities, which saw their voice 
(and privileges) being lost within subnational authorities that were possibly 
too large to be close to the citizen. However, Ragoussis persisted and it was 
his persistence that allowed for a reform which is going to have long-lasting 
effects on Greece's territorial structure. 
This last reform took place within an environment of intensified inter-
national and domestic financial crisis, which has brought about deep changes 
in the Greek political, social and economic lives. The crisis has started altering 
fundamentally the way subnational government functions, but its direct and 
indirect results are to be seen in the years to come. 
6. DISCUSSION 
It follows from this analysis that the process of the territorial restructuring of 
Greece has been unfolding in various paces for decades, while major decisions 
are still pending. In that sense, it is a reform process that is far from com-
plete. However, a number of obvious themes have been prevalent that deserve 
some discussion: 
• Intergovernmental relations. A major question is whether or not subnational 
authorities have been strengthened after all those reforms that have taken 
place from 1980 onwards. Arguably, there has been a degree of decentral-
isation of the polity in the last thirty years, and subnational authorities have 
been strengthened. However, the strengthening of subnational authorities that 
has been achieved is not as pronounced as one would expect. In Greece, the 
legal reality does not necessarily correspond to the political realities, since laws 
are not always fully implemented in practice. In the case of the Greek sub-
national authorities the most weakening factor is the fact that they are tradi-
tionally kept hostage in economic terms. It is undeniable that their compe-
tences have increased. However, their relative financial position is still in a per-
ilous state. The central government has withheld money that is necessary for the 
exercise of competences. As a matter of fact, this practice has become especially 
pronounced from the late 1990s onwards. Hence, in relative terms the finan-
cial position of subnational government has deteriorated. It is expected that the 
current financial crisis is going to worsen its net financial position even further. 
• Domestic vs. International factors. Europeanisation has only been a secondary 
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factor in the process of the territorial restructuring of the country. In all three 
decades explored, it was mainly domestic factors that pushed for the reforms 
analysed in this article. In the 1980s, it was the pro-decentralisation ideology of 
PASOK, no matter how superficial, that was the engine behind the meager re-
forms, alongside a general quest for the démocratisation of the polity. It was 
only in the creation of the regions, in 1986, that Europeanization played an im-
portant role. In the 1990s, the major discourse gradually shifted from the need 
to democratise the polity towards better efficiency in subnational govern-
ment. After the PASOK Modernises' advent to power in 1996 the quest for 
achieving more efficiency and for modernising the country became a discur-
sive focal point. The EU regional policy did not always work towards the em-
powerment of subnational authorities. Sometimes, the requirement to absorb 
the EU regional policy funds in a fast and efficient way worked against the 
empowerment of the weak Greek subnational authorities. Finally, in the 2000s 
the convergence of the official political views held by the two major parties, 
which partly needs to be understood against the background of the New 
Public Management discourse, played an important role. At the same time, 
globalisation, Europeanization and policy transfer became more pronounced. 
Throughout the years, a multitude of factors worked against this slow de-
centralisation process. Politicians at the central and local levels, the ministries' 
bureaucratic elites, as well as the general public fear towards new subnational 
authorities' schemes played their own role in slowing down reforms, or in 
some cases even reversing them. Those factors were predominantly domestic 
in nature and were strong enough at times to successfully retain the status 
quo. Nevertheless, as stated in the introduction, it would be naïve to attempt 
a complete and clear separation between domestic and international factors. 
Domestic factors played a decisive role towards the final outcome, but in 
many cases the international factors were potent enough to influence the do-
mestic arena by empowering certain actors and weakening others. The case of 
the PASOK modernising faction, for example, and the widespread reforms 
which Sim ids' government attempted to enact in the second half of the 
1990s, should partly be soon through the prism of the incoming EMU and 
the Greeks' desire to become part of it. 
• Incremental vs. Radical change. A major question, already touched upon in 
the theory section, is to what extent the punctuated equilibrium thesis holds 
in the case of subnational government reforms in Greece, or whether there 
has instead been slow, progressive change towards the decentralisation of the 
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country. This question is difficult to answer, since the answer depends on the 
way one perceives change. If change means the official alteration of rules, then 
of course, then of course there are important laws, such as the 1986 law on 
the introduction of the regions, the 1994 one on the introduction of the pre-
fectures, the 1997 "Kapodistrias" law and the 2010 "Kallikratis" reform that 
could pose as the candidates for institutional breaks. However, apart from 
those radical laws, there has been a multitude of other legal documents, of 
lesser importance, which have also shaped the current institutional design of 
the country. But even beyond that, there have been many decisions (such as 
decisions by prefects, mayors etc.) or omissions (such as not issuing presiden-
tial decrees as dictated by a law, or withholding finances that had been ear-
marked for subnational government) that have played their own important 
role in the story of decentralisation in Greece. 
Hence, one should be careful before endorsing the punctuated equilibrium 
thesis too readily. There has never been a period of complete pause of reforms. 
Instead, the number of reforms and the magnitude of change have fluctuated. 
All in all, what one observes in this process is that greater and smaller changes, 
factors that have pushed for and factors that have obtruded reforms have been 
well entangled in a complicated pattern of relations that has altered in shape 
over time. This mesh has never seized to exist and produce outcomes. 
• The role of actors. Alekos Papadopoulos' role in promoting the reforms 
during the years 1996-1998 is undeniable. His ability to accomplish a number 
of reforms shows that actors are capable of changing the course of reforms 
when the timing is correct and when they are equipped with certain qualities, 
such as leadership abilities, persistence and perseverance. However, it would 
be equally wrong to perceive actors as omnipotent, free from the limitations 
that the overarching structure imposes on them. Alekos Papadopoulos man-
aged to pass the "Kapodistrias" reform through the Greek Parliament, despite 
the fierce opposition he faced. However, the reform of the first degree of lo-
cal government remained incomplete. He had to accept a higher number of 
municipalities being created than initially envisaged, while he never managed 
to bring a second law in the Parliament dealing with the municipalities of the 
densely urbanised areas of Attica and Thessaloniki. Similarly, although Yannis 
Ragoussis managed to pass the most far-reaching reform to date in 2010, the 
"Kallikratis" reform has been compromised by the acute financial crisis the 
country has been experiencing in the last few years. 
This brings to the forefront the relationship between actors and structure, 
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which is necessarily dialectical in nature. Structure is powerful and shapes, to a 
great extent, the actors' perceptions of, and abilities to, change the system. 
However, from time to time, powerful actors do manage to seize windows of 
opportunity and change an existing structure. Other times, the window of 
opportunity is open, but because of the actors' inaction and lack of leadership 
it is left to close. This is what happened in most of the 2000s when conditions 
were ripe for radical changes, but no Minister of the Interior took the respon-
sibility to sponsor them. However, apart from those radical changes enacted 
by potent actors' decisions, more research is needed to shed light on the mul-
titude of actions taken by rather insignificant actors, who manage to gradually 
shape the landscape of public administration. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This article has shown that the widespread perception of Greece as a highly 
centralised polity with no ability or incentive to reform is misleading. There is 
no doubt that the country remains highly centralised. However, many far-
reaching subnational government reforms have taken place in the last thirty 
years. The number of municipalities has been decreased radically, while there 
has been experimentation regarding the number and nature of subnational au-
thorities. 
This change has not come about abruptly. Instead, it has constituted a dy-
namic process that has had its own moments of acceleration and setbacks. A 
multitude of factors have influenced the process, which has been non-linear 
and dynamic in nature. The territorial restructuring drama is hardly over. 
New episodes of it are going to unfold in the future, bringing about further 
alterations. 
However, one should stress that there are also powerful factors that have 
been capable to block an even more radical reorganisation of the Greek polity. 
The distribution of power among the different levels of government still 
favours the central state. The tectonic shift that is needed for Greece to be-
come decentralised has not occurred yet. The central state still controls im-
portant financial, administrative and political tools to dictate the rules of the 
game in intergovernmental relations. Despite the changes that have taken 
place and the reforms that might follow in the future, the essentially cen-
tralised design of the Greek polity is still largely in place. 
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